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A , I
I

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ERSELL HARRIS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
vs.
13859
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden
Utah State Prison
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This case is an appeal from the denial of'
a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Ersell
Harris.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus
in the District Court of the Third Judicial Distric
Salt Lake County, Utah.

The Honorable Peter F. Lea

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

heard the argument, and denied petitioner's writ.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The petitioner asks the court to grant the
frit of Habeas Corpus, thereby overruling the
judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial
District, Salt Lake County, Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1967 petitioner Ersell Harris was charged
tfith issuing a fictituous check.

The State commen-

ced prosecution in the Third Judicial District
Hourt, Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 20544.
The complaint was subsequently dismissed on the
motion of the prosecution.
Three years later, in 197 0, the State once agai:
brought charges against petitioner, such charges
arising out of the same set of facts as the 1967
information.

This action was brought in the

District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Case No. 22177.

Petitioner was charged with

uttering a fictituous check in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-26-1(1953), as amended.

Petitioner

was found guilty, and on or about September 29, 1970
was sentenced
to a term of 1-20 years by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Honorable Merrill C. Faux.
Petitioner appealed his conviction, and was
released on bond pending the appeal. Approximately
three years later, in a decision dated January 7,
1974, the conviction was sustained on appeal by
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, Case
No. 12424, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 (1974).
Imposition of sentence followed the affirmance
of the judgment of conviction, and petitioner
is presently being held in the custody of the
respondent in his capacity as Warden of the Utah
State Prison.
Effective as of July 1, 197 3, Utah adopted
a new criminal code.

Petitioner's appeal was

pending at this time, and was not heard until
six months after the effective date. Although
the new criminal code was in effect at the time
of the imposition of petitioner's sentence (January,
1974), the penalty imposed upon petitioner was
based on the statutory provision in force at the
time of petitioner's conviction (September, 1970).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT I
THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST ERSELL HARRIS
WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT IT WAS INVALID AND INSUFFICIENT ON ITS FACE AND
DID NOT GIVE THE COURT OR THE DEFENDANT
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHAT OFFENSE WAS INTENDED TO BE CHARGED.
A.

THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST ERSELL HARRIS
WAS INVALID AND INSUFFICIENT ON ITS FACE.

In order to facilitate the job of the prosecutor
md to insure criminal defendants fair and adequate
lotice of the charge against them, the Utah Code
)f Criminal Procedure has adopted standardized
:orms for complaints.

These standard forms, as

collected in Utah Code Ann. §77-21-47(1953), indicate what elements should be included in a criminal
complaint before it is valid and sufficient on
.ts face.
The complaint filed against Ersell Harris
^Complaint #18348, contained in the record) did
Lot meet the standards set forth in the statute
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School, BYU.
md was,
therefore,
defective
andClark
insufficient
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. §77-21-47(1953), supra., indicates
that the words, "uttered a_s genuine a forged instrument," should be present when the offense of
uttering a forged instrument is charged.

In the

Ersell Harris complaint, such words were omitted,
as the complaint read as follows:
That the said Ersell Harris, at the time
and place aforesaid, did utter and pass a
certain instrument, purporting to be a
bank check, knowing the same to be forged,
with the intent to defraud Buy-Rite, a corporation.
State v^ Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949
(1943), supports the above conclusion that, absent
the words "uttered as genuine" the complaint was
defective.

In Jensen, the Court analyzed the

statutory language found in Utah Code Ann. §10521-47 (1943), the predecessor statute to the present
statute in question, Utah Code Ann. §77-21-47 (1953)
The language in the two statutes was unchanged
from the 1943 codification to the 1953 codification.

In discussing the statute, the Court

indicated that the words "uttered as genuine"
must be used in order to make the complaint sufDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
ficient to invoke
jurisdiction.
Jensen at 955.

6
Since such words were not used in the instant
:ase, the complaint was invalid and insufficient
:o invoke jurisdiction.
B.

THE INVALID AND INSUFFICIENT COMPLAINT
FILED AGAINST HARRIS DID NOT GIVE THE
COURT OR THE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF WHAT
OFFENSE WAS INTENDED TO BE CHARGED.

It is a fundamental principle under the Utah
3ode of Criminal Procedure that every person accused
}f a crime has the right "to be informed of the
lature and cause of the accusation."

People v.

iill, 3 Utah 334, 355, 3P. 75 ( ). This information must be given with sufficient certainty
md completeness so that the court may know how
:o render judgement and the defendant may know
rtiat he must answer.

This common-law principle

ras codified by the Utah Legislature in Utah Code
uin. §77-21-8(1), (1953), which states:
The information or indictment may charge,
and is valid and sufficient if it charges
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted in one or more of the following
ways:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

(b) By stating,
so OCR,
much
of the
Machine-generated
may contain
errors. definition

7
law or of the statute defining the offense
or in terms of substantially the same meaning/
as is sufficient to give the court and the
defendant notice of what offense is intended
to be charged.
The complaint filed against Harris did not meet
either the common-law or the statutory requirements
Df certainty and notice.

Harris was charged with

Eorgery under Utah Code Ann. §7 6-26-1.

Under this

statute, one may be convicted of the crime of
naking the forged instrument, or of uttering as
genuine an instrument known to be false, or of
both making and uttering a forged instrument.
State v^ Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937).
In addition, under Utah Code Ann. 76-26-7 (1953),
an individual may be charged with making, or with
uttering as genuine, or with both making and utterin(
fraudulent paper.

State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478,

L36 P.2d 949 (1943).

Since the simple crime of

"passing a bad check" may be charged and prosecuted
inder either of the above statutes, and in any
Df the ways or combinations of the ways above indicated, an accused person must be informed of
lis charge with great specificity in order to have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adeauate notice.
In addition, since the* nrpnar^finn

8
f an answer and a defense is contingent upon
nowing exactly how one is charged, no flexibility
an be allowed in the form of the complaint if
.he requirement of certainty and notice is to
>e met.

Finally, since the kind of proof varies

lepending on the exact charge, the defendant must
>e adequately informed of the exact charge against
dm in order to assure a fair trial.
As demonstrated in Point A, supra., the complain
.n the instant case was invalid and insufficient
>n its face.

By leaving out the words "uttered

is genuine" the defendant was unable to know with
certainty the exact nature of the charge against
lim. Although the complaint indicated that the
lefendant was being charged with the general crime
)f forgery, the confused nature of the crime of
forgery and the myriad ways in which it can be
charged and prosecuted require that a specific
complaint be drawn. As such, the defects on the
race of the complaint were not cured under Utah
:ode Ann. §77-21-8 (1) (b), supra., and the complaint
remains defective.

Since such defect goes to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•undamental issue of notice to the defendant,
_t is contended that the complaint should be held
roid and insufficient, and the case reversed on
jrounds of no jurisdiction.
POINT II
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO BE RESENTENCED
IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE.
The new Utah Criminal Code became effective
July 1, 1973, Utah Code Ann. §76-1-102 et seq.
Prior to that date, petitioner had been tried,
convicted and sentenced, but his appeal and commitent to prison occured subsequent to the effective
date.

State v. Harris 30 U2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313

(1974); TR, 2-3.

On this basis, petitioner contends

that his sentencing to the penalty under the repealed code is in error.
The law in Utah already enables individuals
charged with criminal offenses which occured prior
to the effective date of the new Criminal Code
to be afforded the benefit of the lesser penalties
under the amendatory statutes.

The savings clause

of the new Utah Criminal Code, Utah Code Ann.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

76-1-103(2), mandates the application of any
imitation on punishment under the new code where
he defendant is tried after the effective date.
The case law in Utah has gone even further
n determining the applicability of amendatory
egislation.

In State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392,

90 P.2d 334 (1971) and Belt v^ Turner, 25 U.2d
180., 483 P.2d 425 (1971), this Court held that
rtiere the amended statute became effective prior
:o the date of sentencing, the amended statute
controlled the punishment and the defendant was
entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty
ander the new Criminal Code.

Thus, even if the

trial and conviction occur prior to the effective
date, the amended statute controls the penalty.
The savings clause, §Utah Code Ann. 76-1-103(2)
also permits the limitation on punishment under
the new code to be applicable where the defendant
is retried after the effective date. Thus, even
if the trial, conviction and sentence occur prior
to the effective date, the amended statute controls
the penalty where the defendant is retried subsequen
to the effective date.

In this regard, the savings

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:lause expands on the holdings of this court in
State v^ Miller, 24 U. 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970) ,
is well as State v. Tappand Belt v. Turner, supra.
En Miller, the court held that the fact that the
statute under which the defendant was charged
^as amended pending appeal did not require the
:ase to be remanded for resentencing.

In Tapp

Lt was held that.if the statute reducing the penalty
lad not become effective until after conviction
ind sentence, the sentence under the repealed
statute stood.

In Belt the court found that where

:he amendatory statute provides for a lesser penalty
ind becomes effective subsequent to sentencing
)ut prior to final judgment, no constitutional
luestion was involved.
All three cases are admittedly distinguishable
from the present case as they were heard by this
:ourt prior to the effective date of the new criminal
:ode, including the savings clause provisions,
[owever, in the recent case of State v. Saxton,
\0 U.2d 456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974), this court
Leld that the defendant, who was tried prior to
.he effective date of the new code but sentenced
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fter, was entitled to the new, lesser sentence,
otwithstanding the literal provisions of the
avings clause.

The court thus continued to respect

he thrust of the new sentencing provisions.
t follows that where trial, conviction, sentence,
mposition of sentence, appeal, or retrial occur
»r are pending subsequent to the effective date
>f the amendatory legislation, the sentence is
>r should be that provided in the amended provisions.
Neither the savings clause nor the applicable
:ase law expressly address the issue in this case,
lere, the appeal was pending on the effective
late of the new code, the judgement of conviction
tfas subsequently affirmed, and imposition of sentence
secured after the effective date. Literally read,
bhe savings clause is applicable in this situation
Dnly where the defendant is successful on appeal
and granted a new trial.

However, a narrow constru-

ction of the savings clause is both unnecessary
and unwarranted as demonstrated by this court
in State v. Saxton, supra., where this court did
iecline to read narrowly the savings clause here
at issue.

The court expressely rejected the state's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rgument that the language of the savings clause
perated as a legislative overruling of the holdings
n State v. Tapp and Belt v. Turner, supra, regarding
he applicable penalty when sentencing occurs
fter the effective date:
The fact that the final "except" clause confers
further assurance that anyone "tried or retried"
after the effective date of the act shall
also have the benefit of a change to a lesser
penalty, should not be regarded as depriving
this defendant of the benefit. 30 U.2d at
459, 419 P.2d at 1342.
'hus this court has reasonably read into the savings
ilause rules of law which are not within the scope
•f its literal reading.

The court's intent suggests

hat application of the amendatory sentencing
>rovision is both reasonable and appropriate in
:he facts of this case as well as in Saxton, supra.
In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) ,
:he United States Supreme Court held that the ap>licability of a savings clause to a repealed
:riminal statute is a question of interpretation
>f legislative intent appropriate for determination
>y the state court.

This court, in Belt v. Turner

15 u.2d 230, 479 P.2d 791 (1971) determined that
L new policy adopted by the legislature concerning
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

)unishment for an offense should inure to the

enefit the defendant, even though the offense
as been committed prior to the amendatory legislatio
hus in Utah the judicial position in the case
f amendatory legislation reducing punishment
avors lenity.
In the case of In Re Estrada 48 Cal. Rptr.
.72, 408 P.2d 948 (1965), the California Supreme
lourt elaborated upon the legislative intent conlerning amendatory penalty provisions:
There is one consideration of paramount importance. It leads inevitably to the conclusion
that the Legislature must have intended,
and by necessary implication provided, that
the amendatory statute should prevail. When
the Legislature amends a statute so as to
lessem the punishment it has obviously expressly
determined that its former penalty was too
severe and that a lighter punishment is
proper as punishment for the commission of
the prohibited act. It is an inevitable
inference that the Legislature must have
intended that the new statute imposing the
new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which
it constitutionally could apply. The
amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts
committed before its passage provided the
judgment convicting the defendant of the
act is not final. This intent seems obvious,
because to hold otherwise would be to conclude
that the Legislature was motivated by a desire
for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted
in view of modern theories of penology. Id,
48 Cal. Rptr. at 175, 408 P.2d at 951; quoted
in part in State v. Tapp, supra; cited in
Digitizedv.
by theTurner,
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Belt
supra.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JL3

ach an interpretation is not only in accord with
egislative intent; it is also consistent with
ontemporary theories of the criminal sanction.
This point is elaborated in People v. Oliver,
51 N.Y.S. 2d 367, 134 N.E. 2d 197 (1956), where
he lesser penalty of the amended statute was
pplied to the defendant:
This application of statutes reducing punishment accords with the best modern theories
concerning the functions of punishment in
criminal law. According to these theories,
the punishment or treatment of criminal ofenders
is directed toward one or more of three ends:
(1) to discourage and act as a deterrent
upon future criminal activity, (2) to confine
the offender so that he may not harm society
and (3) to correct and rehabilitate the offender
There is no place in the scheme for punishment
for its own sake, the product simply of vengeance or retribution, (citations omitted)
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for
a particular crime represents a legislative
judgement that the lesser penalty or the
different treatment is sufficient to meet
the legitimate ends of the criminal law.
Nothing is to be gained by imposing the more
severe penalty after such a pronouncement;
the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis,
serve no purpose other than to satisfy a
desire for vengeance. As to a mitigation
of penalties, then, it is safe to assume,
as the modern rule does, that it was the
legislative design that the lighter penalty
should be imposed in all cases that subsequently
reach the courts. Id, 151 N.Y.S. 2d at 373,
134 N.E. 2d at 201-2; quoted in Belt v. Turner
and In Re Estrada, supra.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Common sense and logic dictate tnat wnere,
.s here, petitioner's appeal was pending on and
lis commitment to prison occured subsequent to
:he effective date of the new Utah Criminal Code,
:he ameliorating penalty provision of the amendatory
statute applies.

It should make no difference

;o the applicability of the amendatory penalty
/hether the direct appeal was successful or not
Ln obtaining a new trial for the defendant.

The

Legislature apparently overlooked the situation
tfhere the commitment occured subsequent to the
effective date or where the appeal was pending
m d subsequently lost.

Its intent would appear

bo be however, to afford the lesser penalty in
such situations, in accord with the preceding
policy and theoretical considerations.
The preceding arguments are not novel; the
:ase law elsewhere has been in substantial agreement
In Bell v. Maryland, supra the court found that
tfhere the judgment of conviction has not become
final, the proceeding is deemed pending.

This

has significance where the amended statute provides
a lesser penalty.

In Commonwealth v. Goodman,

Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunterthe
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School,
BYU.
311 A.2d
652
(1973),
Pennsylvania
Supreme
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

inal prior to the adoption of the new act, the
efendant is entitled to be resentenced under
he latter act.

The finality of a judgment of

onviction does not vest upon conviction, sentence,
»r commitment necessarily.

The rule, spelled

•ut, is thus:
that a judgment is not final until the availability at appeal has been exhausted and
the time for petition for certiorari has
elapsed. Id, 311 A.2d at 6 55, quoted from
Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ,
at 622, n.5.
Thus, under the facts and circumstances of
:his case, petitioner's judgment of conviction
ras not final since his appeal was pending on
:he effective date of the new code and he had
lot yet been committed.

The same position, that

;he judgment is not final while the case is awaiting
ippellate review, has been taken by the North
larolina Court which has held that no subsequent
mnishment can be imposed under the repealed statute.
See State v^ Pardon, 272 NC 72, 157 SE2d 698 (1967) ,
:ited in State v. Tapp, supra, this court noting
:hat Pardon was consistent with the Tapp holding;
State v^ Godwin, 13 N.C. App. 700, 187 SE2d 400 (1972
Digitizedv.
by theHart,
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law207
School,SE2d
BYU.
md State
22 N.C.
App.
738,
766
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
74).

In accord is Illinois, which has repeatedly

i that final adjudication has not been reached
re an appeal of the conviction is pending upon
effective date of the new legislation, and
refore that the defendant is entitled to be
entenced under the new law.

See People v. Lucien,

111. App. 3d 289, 302 NE2d 371 (1973); People
McCall, 14 111. App. 3d 340, 302 NE2d 400 (1973);
>ple v^ Marin, 56 111. 2d 490, 309 NE2d 9 (1974);
iple v. Grant, 57 111. 2d 264, 312 N.E. 2d 276 (1974)
. People v^ Holiday, 2111. App. 3d 796, 316 NE2d
i (1974).
The Nebraska Supreme Court, while in agreement
Lt the amended statute mitigating punishment
applicable where the appeal is heard subsequent
its effective date, has further ruled that
lishment exceeding the maximum provided in the
mded act is excessive.

See State v. Waldrop,

L Neb. 434, 215 NW2d 633 (1974); State v. White,
L Neb. 772, 217 NW2d 916 (1974); State v. Patterson,
I Neb. 308, 220 NW2d 235 (1974); and State v^_
les, 192 Neb. 548, 222 NW2d 831 (1974).

Since

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
3 maximum
sentence
under the controlling section
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
;he new code* UCA 76-6-501(4), is less than
penalty appellant received under the old code
vision, UCA 76-26-1, the penalty is excessive
*r the reasoning of the Nebraska courts.
The reasoning of In Re Estrada, supra, has
n followed in California, permitting the defendant
benefit of the lesser penalty where an appeal
pending or final judgment had not been rendered
of the effective date of the amended statute.
In Re Corcoran, 50 Cal. Rptr. 529, 413 P.2d
(1966); Bennett v. Procunier, 69 Cal. Rptr.
, 262 Cal. App 2d, 799, (1968); and People v.
nstone, 77 Cal. Rptr. 867, 273 Cal. App. 2d,
(1969).

Further, California has extended the

>licability of the benefit in its most recent
le where the imposition of sentence occurred
isequent to the effective date of the new law.
>ple v. Cloud, 81 Cal. Rptr. 716, 1 Cal App 3d
.(1969).
To summarize, many jurisdictions confronted
;h the applicability question of sentencing
^visions guarantee the defendant the benefits
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the lesser penalties.

Petitioner's judgment

conviction was not final in that it was pending
eal on and he had not been committed to prison
il subsequent to the effective date of the
Utah Criminal Code.

Therefore, petitioner

entitled to be resentenced under the amendatory
.tutes with the benefit of the lesser penalty.
POINT III
THE SAVINGS CLAUSE OF THE NEW UTAH CRIMINAL
CODE OPERATES AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
OF LAW AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, AND IS VIOLATIVE OF THE UTAH AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
Article I, §2, of the Utah Constitution and
e Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
nstitution contain essentially the same guarantees
equal protection under the law.

The savings

ause in the new criminal code, UCA §76-1-103(2)
eates two classes of criminal defendants which
e not treated alike.

Both classes consist of

irsons who committed their offense prior to the
ifective date of the amendatory legislation and
10 had appeals pending from their judgment of
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/iction at that date.

The class of defendants

:h prevails on appeal and is granted a retrial
iffbrded the benefit of the lesser penalties
*r the new code upon reconviction, regardless
:he grounds for reversal; the other class,
sisting of those defendants unsuccessful on
*al, is not afforded this benefit and must
re the sentence provided by the old penalty•
3 the applicability in this situation of the
provisions depends not on when the offense,
il, conviction, sentence, final judgment, or
nitment occur, but upon the resolution of the
sal.

Such a construction cannot stand constitu-

lal scrutiny.

Petitioner, by not being afforded

benefit of the lesser penalty under the amendatory
:ute, is unconstitutionally denied equal pro:ion of the law.
The facts of this case and the language of
Utah Savings Clause distinguish it from other
>s where no denial of equal protection has
1 found in imposing a previously longer sentence
a crime for which the penalty has been legisby the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
.vely Digitized
changed.
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;titutionality of savings clauses per se, a
ing for those attacking them would have established
:edent or an essentially impossible burden
:he states to adjust all existing sentences
iequent to the change.

In this case, however,

Utah legislature did not adopt a wholesale
.ngs clause, but rather created exceptions
.ts operation.

It thus recognized that, with

ie exceptions, contemporary penal policy and
>ry underlying the criminal sanction suggest
. amendatory lessening of penalties should
e to the benefits of the defendant even where
offense is committed prior to the amendatory
slation becoming effective.

While the Utah

slature should be commended for its progressive
dpoint, it has, through these exceptions,
ted petitioner and those similarly situated
i the protection of the new policy, perhaps
Istake.

The probable legislative intent,

the constitutional requirement of equal protection
aw, require that all persons having their
ment of conviction pending on direct appeal
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> be afforded the lesser penalty of the amendatory
Lslation.

This conforms with the legislative

_cy in the realm of criminal law not to apply
>s of strict construction, but rather to construe
law according to the fair import of its terms
to effect the objectives and purposes of the
linal sanction:
§76-1-104•

See generally UCA §76-1-106,

To the extent that it contravenes

savings clause, the policy of the Utah legislature
the constitutional requirement of equal protection
.aw, Belt v^ Turner 25 U.2d 380, 483 P.2d 425
'1) must be either modified or overruled. The
ir Utah case law on this subject is distinguishable
reasons stated in Point II.
Petitioner must be resentenced in accord
L the new Utah Criminal Code, to make constitual the savings clause which has permitted
state to prosecute persons for offenses under
old law subsequent to the effective date of
al; otherwise, under the common law rule enunciated
ell v. Maryland, supra, all pending criminal
eedings would have to be dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
The vagueness and uncertainty in the language
the complaint filed against petitioner as to
t offense with which it was intended that he be
rged operated as a denial of adequate notice,
ther, the complaint was insufficient to envoke
jurisdiction of the court.

Under these con-

tions, the complaint being fatally defective,
itioner's judgment of conviction must be resed and his release ordered.
When the new Utah Criminal Code became eftive, petitioner's appeal from his conviction
: pending, and his sentence was not imposed until
er this court affirmed his conviction.

Petitioner

therefore entitled to be sentenced under the
visions of the amendatory legislation, either
ler a theory of legislative intent, case law, and
.icy regarding the criminal sanction, or under a
>ory of constitutional mandate by virtue of the
lal protection clauses of the Utah and United
ites Constitutions.

Under these contentions,

:itioner's sentence under the old code must be
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ted and his «case must be remanded for reselling under the new Utah Criminal Code.
Respectfully submitted,
E. BARNEY GESAS
Salt Lake County Bar
Legal Services
Attorney for petitioner
Ersell Harris, Jr.
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